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Re-Engineering Digital Delivery Models to Circumvent 
Copyright Liability After Aereo 
Megan Larkin* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1950s, broadcasters waged war on a new, disruptive technology that 
threatened to change the television industry forever:  cable.  Broadcasters and their 
allies attempted to stifle cable by exercising their intellectual property rights, 
calling  cable  a  “huge  parasite  in  the  marketplace”  and  attacking  it  for  exploiting  the  
works of others.1  Today, broadcasters face a new technology threatening to disrupt 
the television landscape:  services disseminating television programming via the 
Internet.  Just as they did in the 1950s, broadcasters have launched a legal battle 
against these services, characterizing them as exploitative—the modern parasites in 
the marketplace. 
Aereo, a service that captures over-the-air television and transmits it via the 
Internet to paying subscribers, is at the center of this dispute.  Echoing the early 
cries   that  cable  would  “prove  more  revolutionary   than   the  printing  press,”2 Aereo 
has been heralded as a victory for innovation and consumer choice in an otherwise 
archaic television industry, turning laptops and smartphones into television sets and 
leaving   behind   the   days   of   a   “giant   rooftop   antenna   or   awkward   rabbit   ears.”3  
Aereo is able to provide consumers with an alternative to set-top boxes, expensive 
contracts and bundled plans, while keeping prices at a modest $8 per month by not 
paying licensing or retransmission fees to broadcasters.4  Aereo argued that such 
fees were unnecessary because they simply provided consumers with a means of 
 
 * Columbia Law School, J.D. Candidate, 2015; Editor-in-Chief, Columbia Science & 
Technology Law Review, 2014–2015.  Sincere thanks to Professor Jane Ginsburg and Professor 
Robert Clarida for their invaluable insight and guidance in the writing of this Note.  
 1. See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH:  THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 179 
(2011).  We know today that the broadcasters ultimately lost their fight, as cable changed the 
television landscape forever. 
 2. Id. at 176.  
 3. See About Aereo, AEREO (Feb. 3, 2013), https://aereo.com/about. 
 4. See Jeff John Roberts, Aereo’s Big Bet to Break the TV Industry:  CEO Chet Kanojia 
Explains, GIGAOM (Feb. 7, 2013), http://gigaom.com/2013/02/07/aereos-big-bet-to-break-the-tv-
industry-ceo-chet-kanojia-explains; Ryan Kim, IAC-Banked Aereo Makes a Big Play for Cord Cutters, 
GIGAOM (Feb. 14, 2012), http://gigaom.com/2012/02/14/iac-backed-aereo-makes-a-big-play-for-cord-
cutters; Beth Carter, Introducing Aereo:  One Small Step for Cord Cutting, One Giant Leap of Faith, 
WIRED.COM (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.wired.com/business/2012/02/aereo-cord-cutting. 
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doing something that consumers were already legally entitled to do.5  Broadcasters, 
of course, disagreed.6 
Over the years, the growth of digital technology has created countless methods 
and modes of communicating content to the public that, like Aereo, have 
challenged the status quo.7  Methods of content delivery that constitute 
performance to the public are covered by the Transmit Clause of the public 
performance right,8 which was added by Congress in response to the Supreme 
Court’s   rulings   that   unauthorized   retransmission   of   television   broadcasts   did   not  
violate copyright law.9  Recent development of Internet-based services designed to 
retransmit copyrighted content to subscribers has created confusion about which 
transmissions  are  considered  “public.”    In  two  recent  decisions,  the  Second  Circuit  
has attempted to interpret what constitutes “public”  under  the  Transmit  Clause.10 
In WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (“Aereo”),   broadcasters   brought   suit   against  
Aereo, arguing that the use of individual antennas to retransmit individualized 
copies live over the Internet is a violation of the Transmit Clause because such 
activity results in   performing   copyrighted   works   “to   the   public.”11  The Second 
Circuit   disagreed,   holding   that  Aereo  was   not   performing   copyrighted  works   “to  
the  public,”   even   though   thousands  of   subscribers  were   receiving   retransmissions 
of   copyrighted   content.      The   Second   Circuit’s   rationale   was   based   on   its   earlier  
decision in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (“Cablevision”),  in  which  it  
held   that   the  meaning  of  “public”   is  determined  by  who  is  capable  of   receiving  a  
transmission from a particular copy.12  Thus, as long as a transmission from a 
particular copy is private, the public performance right is not violated. 
By   prioritizing   form   over   substance,   the   Second   Circuit’s   interpretation   has  
created a massive loophole in copyright protection, allowing any digital content 
 
 5. See Our Response, AEREO (Mar. 1, 2012), http://blog.aereo.com/2012/03/our-response/ 
(“Consumers are legally entitled to access broadcast television via an antenna and they are entitled to 
record television content for their personal use.  Innovations in technology over time, from digital 
signals to Digital Video Recorders (‘DVRs’), have made access to television easier and better for 
consumers.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Reuters, CBS Threatens to Cut Off Broadcast Signal if Aereo Wins, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/11/cbs-aereo_n_4941089.html. 
 7. In fact, in the 1970s, cable television was one of the “disruptive” technologies that challenged 
the then-dominant broadcasting television industry.  See WU, supra note 1, at 177, 179. 
 8. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (The Transmit Clause provides that “to perform or display a work 
‘publicly’ means . . . (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a 
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members 
of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different times”). 
 9. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 405 (1974) (holding 
that unauthorized retransmission of television broadcasts, received by antenna and retransmitted to 
subscribers via coaxial cable, did not require licenses from copyright holders because the cable systems 
did not “perform” those works); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395 
(1968). 
 10. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 689–94 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. 
Ct. 896 (2014) (mem.); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 11. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 682–83. 
 12. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 134. 
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delivery service to transmit copyrighted works to thousands of people without 
engaging in an infringing act.  Although the Supreme Court has granted certiorari 
in Aereo to clarify the scope of the public performance right as it applies to 
retransmissions of television broadcasts over the Internet,13 the   Second   Circuit’s  
loophole has much broader consequences, implicating the entire Copyright Act and 
extending to all digital media. 
This Note argues that the Second Circuit’s  interpretation  of  the  Transmit  Clause  
eviscerates   the   meaning   of   “public”   within   the   digital   realm   and   has   created   a  
blueprint for business models to completely circumvent copyright liability.  Part I 
provides the background of the public performance right, focusing on the role that 
technology has played in the addition of the Transmit Clause and on relevant 
judicial  interpretation.    Part  II  argues  that  the  Second  Circuit’s  interpretation  of  the  
Transmit  Clause  was  improper;;  it  tests  the  court’s  blueprint by re-engineering past 
business models to show how they could have evaded liability.  Part III proposes 
that, in order to prevent the breakdown of traditional copyright protection in the 
digital realm, courts should prioritize function over form and adopt a delivery-
agnostic approach to evaluating copyright infringement.14 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT IN 
LIGHT OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 
The exclusive right to publicly perform has been particularly affected by the 
progression of technology over the past century.  As companies develop new 
techniques for sharing content, issues continue to arise as to the meaning of 
“publicly  perform”  and  the  level  of  protection  that  should  be  afforded  by  the  public  
performance right.  Congress attempted to clarify these issues by adding the 
Transmit Clause to the Copyright Act in 1976.15  However, technology has evolved 
rapidly, and new challenges surrounding the application of the public performance 
right have now fallen to the courts. 
Part I will explore the evolution of the public performance right in light of 
 
 13. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461 (petition 
granted Jan. 10, 2014), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/ 
ABCvAereo_ 11Oct13.pdf. 
 14. Contrary to arguments Aereo and its proponents made, the Second Circuit’s interpretation is 
not necessary to allow legitimate cloud technologies, such as DropBox or Amazon Cloud Player, to 
continue to function without liability.  As the Solicitor General has argued, there is a distinction between 
neutral services that enable consumers to store and play back their own lawfully acquired content, on the 
one hand, and services that offer consumers initial access to copyrighted content on the other.  A 
consumer using the former service to stream his content for private playback will receive a performance 
analogous to playing back a DVD, which requires no additional licensing.  Additionally, transmissions 
for personal use would be protected by fair use principles under 17 U.S.C. § 107.  See Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Aereo, No. 13-461, 31–32 (Mar. 2014).  
Cablevision also observed that cloud technology providers might invoke the safe harbors within the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, although it is unclear whether such protection would be complete.  
See CABLEVISION, AEREO AND THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT 16 (2013), available at http://www. 
cablevision.com/pdf/cablevision_aereo_white_paper.pdf. 
 15. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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emerging technology.  Part I.A will discuss provisions of the Copyright Act that are 
particularly influenced by new technology.  Parts I.B and I.C will discuss the 
background surrounding Congress’   addition   of   the  Transmit  Clause   to   the   public  
performance right.  Part I.D will consider the modern judicial interpretation of the 
Transmit Clause, particularly as it relates to retransmission of digital content.  This 
section will provide a foundation from which to analyze the Transmit Clause as 
applied to digital retransmissions of copyrighted content. 
A.  PROVISIONS OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT OFTEN INFLUENCED BY EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGY 
Content providers have traditionally protected their business models and content 
by exercising their rights under the Copyright Act.  Section 106 of the Copyright 
Act confers upon owners of copyrighted material the exclusive rights to:  (1) 
“reproduce  the  copyrighted  work”;;  (2)  “prepare  derivative  works”  based  upon  the  
original work;;   (3)   “distribute   copies”   of   the   original   work   to   the   public;;   (4)  
“perform   the   copyrighted   work   publicly”;;   (5)   “display   the   copyrighted   work  
publicly”   and   (6)   perform   a   digital   audio   transmission   publicly.16  While the 
exclusive rights conferred on copyright owners often overlap in the digital realm, 
the rights of reproduction and public performance particularly have served as 
significant tools for content providers in their fight against copyright infringers.  
Consequently, interpretations of those two rights are often the subject of debate. 
1.  The Reproduction Right:  17 U.S.C. § 106(1) 
Although not central to this Note, the reproduction right is often associated with 
the public performance right when digital retransmissions are at issue.  An 
explanation of the reproduction right, which this Note will explore later in 
conjunction  with   the   Second  Circuit’s   interpretation   of   the  Transmit  Clause,  will  
clarify the ramifications of recent decisions on digital retransmission. 
Infringement under § 106(1) requires a reproduction of the original work in 
copies.17  Thus, the central question in determining the scope of the reproduction 
right  is  what  constitutes  a  “copy.”    Section 101 defines “copies”  as   
material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later 
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.  The term 
“copies” includes the material object . . . in which the work is first fixed.18 
Digital technology has complicated this definition, raising questions about whether 
temporary  copies  stored  on  a  hard  drive,  or  buffer  copies,  are  sufficiently  “fixed”  to  
constitute a copy.19  While § 101  provides  a  definition  of  “fixed,”20 courts have not 
 
 16. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 17. Id. 
 18. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 19. See, e.g., London Sire Records v. Does, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 171 (D. Mass. 2008). 
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consistently   required   that   a   copy   exist   “for   a   period   of   more   than   transitory  
duration”  in  relation  to  buffer  copies.21 
2.  The Public Performance Right:  17 U.S.C. § 106(4) 
Infringement under § 106(4)  requires  a  performance  of  a  work  “to  the  public.”    
Thus, the two terms relevant to the construction of the public performance right are 
“perform”   and   “public,”  which  Congress   defined   in   § 101.     To   “perform   a  work  
means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any 
device or process.”22  Congress  defined  “public”  as  follows: 
To   perform   or   display   a   work   “publicly”   means—(1) to perform or display it at a 
place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside 
of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to 
transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place 
specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether 
the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it 
in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.23 
This definition  indicates  that  a  performance  can  be  “public”  either  by  occurring  in  a  
public place or by transmission.  Clause two, clarifying what constitutes a public 
performance by transmission, is known as the Transmit Clause and is central to the 
focus of this Note. 
Interpretation of the Transmit Clause has become exceedingly complex as 
digital media have advanced and created new methods of retransmitting 
copyrighted content.  Although the Transmit Clause provides some guidance about 
which transmissions  are  “public,”  courts  have  struggled  with  its  application  to  new  
technology.  In this regard, it is instructive to understand the background of 
Congress’  decision  to  include  the  Transmit  Clause  in  the  public  performance  right. 
B.  THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT UNDER THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT 
The emergence of cable television has created one of the most illustrative 
examples of the conflict between new technology and traditional copyright law.  
This   development   “seemingly   wrote   the   script   for   future   battles”   between  
traditional copyright protection and new technologies seeking to circumvent 
 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment 
in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration.”).  
 21. Compare London Sire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 170–71, 175 n.29 (holding that fixation 
occurs when the copy permits the work to be perceived for a period of more than transitory duration), 
with Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that 
reproductions made in a buffer stream lasting 1.2 seconds were insufficiently “fixed” to constitute 
“copies”). 
 22. 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
 23. Id. 
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liability.24 
With the launch of cable television, cable providers developed technology that 
transmitted broadcast television to subscribers in areas that had previously been 
unable to receive signals due to poor reception.  The broadcasters objected, arguing 
that retransmission of broadcast television content to the public without 
compensation to the broadcasters was copyright infringement.25  The cable 
providers argued that they were not indiscriminately sending signals to the public, 
but were instead sending signals to individual homes to provide a better antenna for 
homes otherwise unable to receive the terrestrial signal.26 
Interpreting the then-current 1909 Copyright Act, which included no clause 
comparable to the current Transmit Clause, the Supreme Court sided with the cable 
providers.  Its Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions held that unauthorized 
retransmission of television broadcasts, received by antenna and retransmitted to 
subscribers via coaxial cable, did not require licenses from copyright holders of the 
broadcast programs because the cable systems   did   not   “perform”   those   works.27  
According to the Court, the cable providers merely facilitated reception by 
providing homeowners with a way to capture content that they could legally 
capture through the use of their own antennas.28 
C.  CONGRESS’ ADDITION OF THE TRANSMIT CLAUSE TO THE PUBLIC 
PERFORMANCE RIGHT AS A RESULT OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS 
The   Supreme   Court’s   decisions   in  Fortnightly and Teleprompter clarified that 
the broadcasters did not have retransmission rights, and thus had no protection 
against unauthorized retransmission by the cable providers.  In response to the 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions, Congress amended the Copyright Act in 
1976.29  The   amendment   essentially   reversed   the   Supreme   Court’s   rulings   by  
providing a retransmission right for terrestrial broadcasters and a compulsory 
licensing scheme.30  The new Transmit Clause expanded the definition of 
 
 24. Chad Guo, Copyright’s Online Destiny, or:  How to Stop Worrying and Love the Net, INTELL. 
PROP. BRIEF, Fall 2013 at 8, 10, available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief/vol4/ 
iss3/1. 
 25. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968); see also 
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 402–3 (1974). 
 26. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395. 
 27. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 405; Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 402 (“With due regard to changing 
technology, we hold that the petitioner did not under that law ‘perform’ the respondent’s copyrighted 
works.”). 
 28. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 405; Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 399–401. 
 29. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 88–89 (1976) (“Pursuant to [these] two decisions of the 
Supreme Court . . . under the 1909 copyright law, the cable television industry has not been paying 
copyright royalties for its retransmission of over-the-air broadcast signals.  Both decisions urged the 
Congress, however, to consider and determine the scope and extent of such liability in the pending 
revision bill.”). 
 30. 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 14:7 (2013) (“Fortnightly and Teleprompter 
were reversed both by the definitions of ‘perform’ and ‘perform publicly’ in Section 101 and by the 
imposition of liability subject to a compulsory license in Section 111(d).”); see 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 111 
(2012). 
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“publicly”  within  the  Copyright  Act: 
To   perform   or   display   a   work   “publicly”   means   . . . (2) to transmit or otherwise 
communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) 
or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the 
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or 
in separate places and at the same time or at different times.31 
Applied to cable television, the Transmit Clause provided greater protection to 
broadcasters and prevented businesses  from  selling  access  to  broadcasters’  signals  
without paying retransmission fees.32  Congress also implemented a compulsory 
licensing scheme to minimize the burden on cable providers, who would otherwise 
be forced to negotiate retransmission licenses with every copyright owner.33  The 
compulsory licensing scheme allows providers to make and distribute 
reproductions of copyrighted works without the direct consent of the copyright 
owner, as long as the provider pays a statutorily established royalty to the copyright 
owner.34 
Although the Transmit Clause was enacted in response to the Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter decisions on cable television, its application extends to any service 
retransmitting   copyrighted   content   publicly.      Congress’   intent   was   not   only   to  
protect broadcasters, but also to account for the many new methods of 
retransmission created by advancing technology.35 
D.  MODERN JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TRANSMIT CLAUSE 
Since 1976, the explosion of digital media has created even more modes of 
transmission to the public, reigniting the battle between copyright owners seeking 
to protect their works and digital media services seeking to evade liability.36  While 
it  is  Congress’  task  to  define  the  scope  of  copyright  protection,37 new technologies 
 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 32. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (“[T]he Committee believes that cable systems are 
commercial enterprises whose basic retransmission operations are based on the carriage of copyrighted 
program material and that copyright royalties should be paid by cable operators to the creators of such 
programs.”). 
 33. Id. (“The Committee recognizes, however, that it would be impractical and unduly 
burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was 
retransmitted by a cable system.”). 
 34. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d), 118 (2012). 
 35. See infra Part II.A for more information about the legislative history of the Transmit Clause. 
 36. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984) 
(regarding home video recording technology); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 
121, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (regarding a cable television system implementing a digital video recorder to 
record and play back cable programs); Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (regarding Internet retransmission of television through use of a remote digital video 
recorder). 
 37. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430–31 (“Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this country, it 
has been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary. . . .  The 
judiciary’s reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative 
guidance is a recurring theme.  Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to 
Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials.”  (citations 
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emerge quickly, and interpretation typically falls on the shoulders of the courts.38  
Although the intent of Congress, as reported in the 1976 House Report, was that the 
Transmit Clause should encompass new forms of technology,39 courts have applied 
the clause inconsistently, with unpredictable results. 
Application of the Transmit Clause to technology that retransmits over-the-air 
broadcast television via the Internet has been particularly contentious.  The 
following section analyzes the major cases interpreting the Transmit Clause as it 
relates to these services. 
1.  Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (“Cablevision”) 
One of the most influential interpretations of the Transmit Clause comes from 
the  Second  Circuit’s  2008  Cablevision ruling.40  In that case, broadcasters owning 
copyrighted programs brought suit against Cablevision, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive   relief   against   the   release   of   a   Remote   Storage   DVR   System   (“RS-
DVR”).    The  RS-DVR, using technology similar to set-top digital video recorders 
(like TiVo DVRs and video-on-demand   (“VOD”)   services),   allowed   subscribers  
without a stand-alone DVR system to record cable programming on central hard 
drives, which were housed and maintained by Cablevision.41  Subscribers 
subsequently received playback of their copy of the programming through their 
home televisions, using a standard cable box and RS-DVR software.42  Each 
subscriber’s  copies  were  unique:  if  10,000  subscribers  wanted  to  record  a  particular  
program, 10,000 copies would be made, each stored on a portion of the server 
accessible only to the customer who made that copy.43  The broadcasters argued 
that use of the RS-DVR infringed their reproduction and public performance 
rights.44  Cablevision contended that it should not be held liable because the 
subscribers made the copies, not Cablevision.  Moreover, it argued, the 




 38. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1991), 
aff’d, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Congress cannot immediately respond to each invention that hits 
the market.  The courts must therefore use their best judgment to construe the meaning of certain words 
consistent with Congressional intent.”). 
 39. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64 (1976) (“The definition of ‘transmit’ . . . is broad enough to 
include all conceivable forms and combinations of wires and wireless communications media.”); S. REP. 
NO. 94-473, at 60 (1975) (“A performance may be accomplished either directly or by means of any 
device or process, including . . . any sort of transmitting apparatus, any type of electronic retrieval 
system, and any other techniques and systems not yet in use or even invented.”   (citations omitted)). 
 40. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).  Although this case 
involved three contested copyright issues, the most relevant to this note is whether the DVR service 
constituted a public performance. 
 41. Id. at 124. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 123. 
 45. Id. at 130–31. 
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a.  RS-DVR Operation 
Essential to the understanding of the case is an understanding of how the RS-
DVR system operates.  Unlike traditional transmissions of broadcast programs, 
which are transmitted to subscriber homes in a single stream via coaxial cable, the 
RS-DVR system splits the data into two streams.46  The first stream is sent to 
subscribers via coaxial cable.  The second stream flows through a Broadband 
Media  Router  (“BMR”),  where  it  is  buffered  and  reformatted,  before  being  sent  to  
the   “Arroyo   Server,”   which   consists   of   two   data   buffers   and   high-capacity hard 
drives at Cablevision facilities.47  The path of the data is as follows: 
The  entire   stream  of  data  moves   to   the   first   buffer   (the   “primary   ingest   buffer”),   at  
which point the server automatically inquires as to whether any customers want to 
record any of that programming.  If a customer has requested a particular program, the 
data for that program move from the primary buffer into a secondary buffer, and then 
onto a portion of one of the hard disks allocated to that customer. . . .  The data buffer 
in the BMR holds no more than 1.2 seconds of programming at any time.48 
Once the data reaches the Arroyo Server, it is stored in a space on the hard drive set 
aside for one subscriber and available only to that subscriber.49  The recorded 
program is stored on the Arroyo Server indefinitely, until either deleted by the 
subscriber or overwritten by Cablevision to make room for a new program.50 
Despite  the  system’s  technical complexity,  the  subscriber’s  experience  is  similar  
to that of using a standard DVR.51  The principal difference is that, unlike a 
traditional DVR, which sends signals from the remote to the on-set box, the 
subscriber sends a signal from the remote, through the cable, to the Arroyo Servers 
at   Cablevision’s   central facility.52  This makes the RS-DVR system similar to a 
VOD service, but with the added capability of playing previously recorded 
content.53  Additionally, the ownership of the RS-DVR box remains with 
Cablevision, and customer access requires a continuing relationship with 
Cablevision.54  Cablevision has physical control of the RS-DVR, and Cablevision 
personnel monitor the programming streams and determine how much memory to 
allot to each user.55  Cablevision also has some control over the content available to 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 124–25. 
 49. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 612 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 125 (explaining that, like a traditional DVR, subscribers can 
record programming by using the remote control, which allows them to either press record while 
watching a program or to navigate the on-screen program guide to select a future program to record). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 618.  This “continuing relationship” distinction 
is unlike that of a standalone VCR, which the customer owns outright after purchase.  
 55. Id. at 619. 
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subscribers, as well as the ability to limit the number of channels available.56 
b.  Second Circuit Decision 
The   Second   Circuit   held   that   Cablevision   did   not   violate   the   broadcasters’  
reproduction or public performance rights.  First, the court held that the primary 
ingest buffer copies, remaining in the buffer for 1.2 seconds, were not sufficiently 
“fixed”  to  constitute  “copies,”  because  they  did  not  last  for  a  period  of  more  than  
transitory duration.57  Second, the court found that the content stored on the Arroyo 
server   did   constitute   “copies.”58  However, Cablevision was not liable for the 
reproduction because it was each subscriber, not Cablevision, who made the 
copies.59  Third, the court held that the copies were not transmitted to the public 
because each playback transmission was made to an individual customer from a 
unique copy produced by that customer.60 
In   first   deciding   that   Cablevision   had   not   created   a   “copy”   while   initially  
buffering data, the Second Circuit held that in order to be fixed, the data must both 
be embodied in a medium that can be perceived and communicated with, and must 
remain embodied for a period of more than transitory duration.61  The court held 
that although the data met the tangible embodiment requirement, the embodiment 
did not last for a period of more than transitory duration because it was only held in 
the buffer for 1.2 seconds before being automatically overwritten.62  Although the 
court acknowledged that the transitory requirement was a fact-specific 
determination, it found that the 1.2-second duration was insufficient to meet the 
standard  set  by  other  precedent,  in  which  data  remained  in  a  user’s  RAM  memory  
until the computer was turned off.63 
The second issue was whether Cablevision was directly liable for creating the 
playback  copies.    Cablevision’s  RS-DVR process starts when a subscriber selects a 
program to record, at which point a copy of the program is created and stored on 
the Arroyo Server.64  In determining whether or not an entity is directly liable, 
“[t]he   question is   who   made   [the]   copy.”65  Following precedent that required 
“some   element   of   volition   or   causation”   for   direct   liability   online,66 the Second 
Circuit  likened  Cablevision’s  RS-DVR process to that of a VCR and consequently 
released Cablevision from liability for direct infringement.67  “In  determining  who  
 
 56. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 125. 
 57. Id. at 130. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 124 (“Critically for our analysis here, plaintiffs alleged theories only of direct 
infringement, not contributory infringement, and defendants waived any defense based on fair use.”). 
 60. Id. at 134. 
 61. Id. at 127. 
 62. Id. at 130. 
 63. Id. at 129–130 (citing MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 
1993)). 
 64. Id. at 131. 
 65. Id. at 130. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 131. 
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actually   ‘makes’   a   copy,”   the   court   observed,   “a   significant   difference   exists  
between making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the 
copying system to make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, 
which   automatically   obeys   commands   and   engages   in   no   volitional   conduct.”68  
Cablevision’s  control  over  selecting  the  programming  available  to  subscribers  was  
insufficiently proximate to the copying to trigger liability.69 
The third   issue  was  whether  Cablevision   publicly   performed   the   broadcasters’  
works through playback of the RS-DVR copies.  Although the Second Circuit 
found that the RS-DVR   playback   from   the   Arroyo   Server   to   the   subscriber’s  
television  resulted  in  “[a]  transmission  of  a  performance  of  a  work,”  the  playback  
did  “not  involve  the  transmission  of  a  performance  ‘to  the  public.’”70  To determine 
whether   a   transmission  was  made   “to   the  public”  under   the  Transmit  Clause,   the  
Second Circuit focused on the potential audience capable of receiving a particular 
“transmission”   or   “performance”   rather   than   on   the   potential   audience   of   a  
particular work.71  Consequently,  “any  factor  that  limits  the  potential  audience  of  a  
transmission   is   relevant.”72  Otherwise, the court reasoned, the potential audience 
for every copyrighted work would be the general public, which would render the 
words  “to  the  public”  within  the  Transmit  Clause  unnecessary.73 
In   conclusion,   the   court   held   that   “because   the  RS-DVR system, as designed, 
only made transmissions to one subscriber using a copy made by that subscriber . . . 
the universe of people capable of receiving the RS-DVR transmission is the single 
subscriber whose self-made  copy  is  used  to  create  that  transmission.”74  However, 
the  court  indicated  limits  to  its  holding:    “[t]his  holding,  we  must  emphasize,  does  
not generally permit content delivery networks to avoid all copyright liability by 
making copies of each item of content and associating one unique copy with each 
subscriber to the network, or by giving their subscribers the capacity to make their 
own  individual  copies.”75 
2.  WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (“Aereo”) 
Several years after its Cablevision decision, the Second Circuit upheld its 
interpretation of the Transmit Clause in relation to television retransmission.76  In 
Aereo, broadcasters filed suit against Aereo for violating their exclusive right to 
publicly perform by transmitting television broadcasts over the Internet.77  Using 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 132. 
 70. Id. at 134. 
 71. Id. at 134–35. 
 72. Id. at 137 (emphasis removed). 
 73. Id. at 135–36. 
 74. Id. at 137. 
 75. Id. at 139–40. 
 76. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 896 
(2014) (mem.). 
 77. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d sub nom. 
WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 683.  The broadcasters only challenged the aspects of Aereo’s service that 
allowed subscribers to view programs contemporaneously with the over-the-air broadcast of the 
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thousands of mini antennas assigned to individual subscribers, Aereo captured 
broadcast  television  signals  at  a  subscriber’s  request,  created  a  unique  copy  of  each  
program available to only that subscriber, and allowed the subscriber to play back 
that copy on a television, computer or mobile-device screen.78  Applying its 
interpretation of the Transmit Clause from Cablevision, the Second Circuit held 
that  Aereo’s   transmissions  were  not  public  performances  because,  due   to  Aereo’s  
technical architecture, the potential audience of each transmission was only one 
subscriber, and thus each transmission  was  not  made  “to  the  public.”79 
a.    Aereo’s  System 
Aereo’s   system   allows   subscribers   to   access   live,   over-the-air broadcast 
television for a monthly subscription fee.80  Aereo provides this service by 
capturing over-the-air broadcast television signals through thousands of mini 
antennas and storing individual copies of the programs on remote hard drives in its 
facilities.81  Subscribers can utilize Aereo to watch live broadcast television solely 
through an Internet connection; no cable subscription service is necessary.82 
From  a  subscriber’s  perspective,  Aereo  functions  similarly  to  a  remote  DVR  or  
Slingbox,83 although Aereo subscribers do not access programming via a cable 
connection.84  After logging on to her personal account, a subscriber can view a 
programming guide, which shows programs that are currently airing as well as 
programs that will be aired in the future.85  When a subscriber selects a program 
that is currently airing, the subscriber can press   “Watch”—at which point the 
program begins playing at a slight delay relative to the live television broadcast—
or   “Record”—which copies and saves the program for later viewing.86  When a 
subscriber  presses  either  “Watch”  or  “Record,”  he  or  she  can  pause and rewind the 
program as desired.87  When a subscriber selects a program that will air in the 
future,  the  subscriber’s  only  option  is  to  press  “Record,”  which  will  copy  and  save  
the program for later playback.88 
Aereo has large antenna boards that each hold approximately eighty 
independently-functioning dime-sized antennas, which capture over-the-air 
broadcast television signals.89  When  a  subscriber  selects  “Watch”  or  “Record,”  a  
 
programs.  See id. 
 78. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 682. 
 79. Id. at 686. 
 80. Id. at 681 (programming is “briefly delayed” for approximately ten seconds relative to the 
over-the-air transmission). 
 81. Id. at 680. 
 82. Id. at 683. 
 83. Id. at 680. 
 84. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d sub nom. 
WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 683.   
 85. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 681. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
 88. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 681. 
 89. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 379.  There was a dispute in the district court as to 
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signal  is  sent  to  Aereo’s  Antenna  Server,  which  assigns  an  individual  antenna and 
transcoder to the subscriber.90  First, the Antenna Server tunes the antenna to the 
broadcast   frequency   of   the   channel   playing   the   subscriber’s   desired   program.91  
Next,   the  Antenna  Server  sends  a  request  to  Aereo’s  Streaming  Server  to  create  a  
personal   directory   to   store   data   captured   by   a   subscriber’s   assigned   antenna.92  
Thus, once a subscriber requests a program, the antenna captures, buffers and sends 
the  data   to   the  Streaming  Server,  where   it   is  copied  and  saved   to   the  subscriber’s  
personal directory  on  Aereo’s  hard  drive.93  Only the original requesting subscriber 
can ever view that particular copy of the programming, even if multiple subscribers 
opt  to  “Watch”  or  “Record”  the  same  program  at  the  same  time.    If  the  subscriber  
has   selected   “Watch,”   the same process occurs, except that only six to seven 
seconds  of  the  programming  is  saved  on  the  subscriber’s  personal  directory  of  the  
hard drive at a time.94 
Thus,   the   three   key   technical   functions   of   Aereo’s   service   are:      (1)   each  
subscriber is assigned to an individual antenna; (2) the signal captured by the 
assigned antenna is used to create unique copies of the program, which are held in 
each   subscriber’s   personal   directory   and   (3)   the   subscriber   watches   his   or   her  
individual copy of the program, which is never accessible to any other Aereo 
subscriber.95 
b.  Second Circuit Decision 
Similar to Cablevision, broadcasters sought to enjoin Aereo from transmitting 
their   copyrighted   programs   “live”   (i.e., contemporaneously with the over-the-air 
broadcast of the programs), claiming that doing so was analogous to 
retransmissions of copyrighted content by cable providers, which requires a license 
under the Transmit Clause.96  Aereo contended that its service did not violate the 
broadcasters’   public   performance   rights because each transmission was made 
available to one subscriber from a unique copy, and was thus private.97 
The   Second   Circuit   held   that   Aereo’s   transmissions   were   not   public  
performances under Cablevision,   affirming   the   district   court’s   denial   of   the  
 
whether the antennas operated independently or as one unit to receive incoming broadcast signals.  The 
Plaintiffs’ expert opined that because the antennas are so small and positioned so closely, the incoming 
signal treats the antennas as a continuous piece of metal.  Despite this, the district court found that 
Aereo’s antennas functioned independently.  See id. at 379–81.  The broadcasters did not appeal this 
finding to the Second Circuit. 
 90. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 683 (explaining that antennas are assigned to subscribers 
dynamically, meaning that once one subscriber stops using her assigned antenna, another subscriber 
might be assigned to use that antenna.  However, no antenna is ever used to create more than one 
subscriber’s copy of the program at a given time). 
 91. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 378. 
 92. Id.  
 93. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 682. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 683. 
 96. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 376. 
 97. Id. at 385. 
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broadcasters’   preliminary   injunction   motion.98  The Second Circuit rejected the 
broadcasters’   argument   that  Aereo’s   service  was   analogous   to   retransmissions  by  
cable providers, which the 1976 Copyright Act viewed as public performances.99  
Instead, the Second Circuit applied the interpretation of the Transmit Clause set 
forth in Cablevision,  given  the  “similar  factual  context”  between  the  two  cases.100 
The   Second   Circuit   relied   on   “four   guideposts”   set   forth   in   Cablevision:  (1) 
under the Transmit Clause, a transmission is a public performance only where the 
individual transmission is capable of being received by the public; (2) whether or 
not the public is capable of receiving the same underlying work should not be 
determined by aggregating many private transmissions; (3) an exception to the no-
aggregation rule exists when private transmissions are generated from the same 
copy   of   the   work   and   (4)   “any   factor   that   limits   the   potential   audience   of   a  
transmission  is  relevant”  to  the  Transmit  Clause  analysis.101 
Applying these   guideposts,   the   Second   Circuit   found   that   Aereo’s   system  
possessed both of the essential features present in Cablevision to avoid violation of 
the  broadcasters’  public  performance  rights.102  First,   like  Cablevision’s  RS-DVR 
system, Aereo creates a unique copy each time an Aereo subscriber chooses to 
“Watch”   or   “Record”   a   program   and   stores   it   in   a   personal   directory   that   is  
inaccessible to other subscribers.103  Second, when the subscriber elects to watch 
the program, the transmission is generated from the unique copy stored in each 
personal  directory:      “[t]hus,   just  as   in  Cablevision, the potential audience of each 
Aereo  transmission  is  the  single  user  who  requested  that  a  program  be  recorded.”104 
The   broadcasters   also   argued   that   “Aereo’s   copies   [were]  merely a device by 
which   Aereo   enable[d]   its   users   to   watch   nearly   live   TV,   while   Cablevision’s  
copies, by contrast, could only serve as the source for a transmission of a program 
after the original transmission . . .  had  finished.”105  Therefore,  Aereo’s  copies were 
“no  different   from   the   temporary  buffer   copies   created  by   Internet   streaming.”106  
Rejecting this argument, the Second Circuit focused on volitional conduct by 
Aereo’s  subscribers,  who  request  creation  of  a  program,  choose  when  and  how  the  
copy will be played back, and have the option to watch it live, pause and rewind it 
or elect not to watch it until long after the over-the-air broadcast.107 
 
 98. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 696. 
 99. Id. at 682.  The Second Circuit rejected the broadcasters’ attempts to distinguish Aereo from 
Cablevision.  First, the Second Circuit found no merit in the broadcasters’ reliance on the fact that in 
Cablevision the cable providers were paying a licensing fee to transmit the programming in the first 
place, because it was irrelevant as to whether they needed a license to retransmit the programs via the 
RS-DVR system.  Id. at 690.  Additionally, the Second Circuit found that the broadcasters’ attempts to 
distinguish Aereo from Cablevision were a veiled attempt for the court to overrule Cablevision, which it 
had no power to do.  Id. at 695. 
 100. Id. at 686. 
 101. Id. at 689 (citations omitted).   
 102. Id. at 689–90 (citations omitted). 
 103. Id. at 690. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (“This second layer of control, exercised after the copy has been created, means that 
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c.  Judge Chin’s Dissent 
Judge  Chin   rejected   the   argument   that  Aereo   provides   a   “technology   platform  
that enables consumers to use remotely-located equipment . . . to create, access and 
view their own unique recorded copies of free over-the-air broadcast television 
programming,”   and   called   Aereo’s   technology   platform   “a   sham.”108  He 
elaborated: 
[T]here is no technologically sound reason to use a multitude of tiny individual 
antennas rather than one central antenna; indeed, the system is a Rube Goldberg-like 
contrivance, over-engineered in an attempt to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act 
and to take advantage of a perceived loophole in the law. . . .  Under  Aereo’s  theory,  
by using these individual antennas and copies, it may retransmit, for example, the 
Super   Bowl   “live”   to   50,000   subscribers   and   yet,   because   each   subscriber   has   an  
individual   antenna   and   a   “unique   recorded   cop[y]”   of   the   broadcast,   these   are  
“private”   performances.     Of   course,   the   argument  makes   no   sense.      These   are   very  
much public performances.109 
Judge  Chin  also  pointed  out  “critical  differences”  between  Aereo and Cablevision, 
most notably that Cablevision was a cable company already paying statutory 
licensing and retransmission consent fees, and Cablevision subscribers could 
already view the programming live through their subscriptions.110  Aereo, on the 
other hand, had no authorization or licenses enabling them to retransmit broadcast 
television.111 
Additionally,  Judge  Chin  differentiated  Aereo’s  service  from  RS-DVR or VCR 
systems, which were designed only to time shift live television broadcasts.  While 
Cablevision’s  RS-DVR existed to create a copy of an already licensed program, 
Aereo’s   system   produced   a   copy   in   order   to   enable   it   to   transmit   programs   to  
subscribers through the Internet.112  “The   core   of   Aereo’s   business   is   streaming  
broadcasts over the Internet in real-time; the addition of the record function, 
however, cannot legitimize the unauthorized retransmission of copyrighted 
content.”113 
Finally,  disagreeing  with  the  majority’s  focus  on  “form  over  substance,”  Judge  
Chin considered the broadly-worded statutory language and legislative history of 
the  Copyright  Act,  determining  that  Aereo’s  service  “fit[]  squarely  within  the  plain  
 
Aereo’s transmissions from the recorded copies cannot be regarded as simply one link in a chain of 
transmission, giving Aereo’s copies the same legal significance as the RS-DVR copies in Cablevision.”). 
 108. Id. at 696–97 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 697. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 701 (“Whereas Cablevision promoted its RS-DVR as a mechanism for recording and 
playing back programs, Aereo promotes its service as a means for watching ‘live’ broadcast television 
on the Internet and through mobile devices. . . .  An Aereo subscriber could not use her own DVR to 
lawfully record content received from Aereo because Aereo has no license to retransmit 
programming.”). 
 113. Id. 
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meaning   of   the   statute.”114  He also considered it to be consistent with the 
legislative   history,   which   made   clear   that   “Congress   intended   to   reach   new  
technologies, like this   one,   that   are   designed   solely   to   exploit   someone   else’s  
copyrighted  work.”115 
In   sum,   Judge  Chin  concluded   that  Aereo’s   transmissions  were,   indeed,  public  
performances  in  violation  of  the  broadcasters’  rights.    He  expressed  concern  about  
what this decision   could   mean:      “[t]oday’s   decision   does   not   merely   deny   the  
broadcasters  a  licensing  fee  for  Aereo’s  activity;;  it  provides  a  blueprint  for  others  to  
avoid  the  Copyright  Act’s  licensing  regime  altogether.”116 
3.  Aereo Progeny 
As of this writing, three of the four district courts that have applied the Transmit 
Clause   to   Aereo’s   service   or   equivalent   technology   have   declined   to   follow   the  
Second Circuit.  In the most recent case, the District Court for the District of Utah, 
finding   Judge   Chin’s   dissent   to   be   “more   persuasive   than   the  majority   opinion,”  
agreed that Aereo was engaging in public performances under any reasonable 
interpretation of the Transmit Clause.117  The court noted that this interpretation 
was supported by the legislative history of the Transmit Clause, as well as the 
sweeping   language  of   the  statute,  which  was   intended   to  apply  “not  only   to  cable  
television but any device or process that could be developed in the future to 
transmit  copyrighted  works  in  any  form  to  the  public.”118  Further, the court noted 
that   the  Second  Circuit’s   focus  on  who  is  “capable  of   receiving”   the  performance  
was  not  supported  by  the  statutory  language,  which  “states  clearly  that  it  applies  to  
any  performance  made  available  to  the  public.”119  The court also supported Judge 
Chin’s  approach  of  elevating  function  over  form,  since  “Congress  made  clear  that  it  
did not want copyright liability to turn on the technical details of a transmission 
service.”120 
Similarly, most district courts have been unwilling to apply the Second Circuit’s  
interpretation of the Transmit Clause to services using technology similar to 
 
 114. Id. at 698–99 (“The statute is broadly worded, as it refers to ‘any device or process.’  Aereo’s 
system of thousands of antennas and other equipment clearly is a ‘device   or   process’.   .   . .  Because 
Aereo is transmitting signals to paying strangers, all of its transmissions are ‘to the public,’ even if 
intervening ‘device[s] or process[es]’ limit the potential audience of each separate transmission to a 
single ‘member[] of the public.’”). 
 115. Id. at 699.  Judge Chin also rejected Aereo’s argument that it makes no legal difference that 
the system is erected and owned by Aereo and not the subscribers themselves, as this is the same 
argument made in Fortnightly and Teleprompter Congress rejected.  Id. 
 116. Id. at 705. 
 117. Community TV of Utah, LLC v. Aereo, Inc., No. 2:13CV910DAK, 2014 WL 642828, at *3 
(D. Utah Feb. 19, 2014). 
 118. Id. at *7.  The court also noted Congress’ determination that “a commercial enterprise should 
not be allowed to build a business off the exploitation of copyrighted programming without 
compensating the owners of that programming.”  Id. 
 119. Id. at *5. 
 120. Id. at *7. 
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Aereo.121  FilmOn  X,  also  known  as  Aereokiller,  provides  a  service  “substantially  
similar”  to  Aereo  “that  uses  the  Internet  to  give  consumers  the  ability  to  watch  live  
over-the-air television channels through their computers and on their mobile 
devices.”122  In a suit brought against FilmOn X, the District Court for the Central 
District  of  California  rejected  the  Second  Circuit’s  position  in  Cablevision that the 
transmission itself must be public in order to infringe the public performance 
right.123  The   court   pointed   out   that   the   statute   “does   not   by   its   express   terms  
require that two members of the public receive the performance from the same 
transmission.”124  The focus should be on the public performance of the 
copyrighted work, rather than the uniqueness of the individual copy from which a 
transmission is made.125  The  court  also  rejected  FilmOn  X’s  argument  that  it  was  
not infringing, and was instead merely providing a service that individuals could 
lawfully do for themselves, because Congress had rejected the same argument after 
the  Supreme  Court’s  Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions.126 
In a subsequent suit brought by broadcasters, the District Court for the District 
of Columbia also found that FilmOn X was publicly performing based on the 
unambiguous and broad language of the statute,127 as  well  as  on  Congress’  stated  
intent to extend the Transmit Clause to new technology beyond radio and television 
broadcasting.128  Similar to Judge  Chin’s  focus  on  substance  rather  than  form,  the  
court   cited   precedent   interpreting   “public   performance”   broadly, given  Congress’  
intent  that  copyright  protection  not  “turn  on  the  mere  method  by  which  television  
signals  are  transmitted  to  the  public.”129 
The   only   court   that   has   followed   the   Second   Circuit’s   interpretation   of   the  
Transmit Clause is the District Court for the District of Massachusetts.130  
Unfortunately, that court provided little support for its decision.  After summarizing 
the Cablevision and Aereo holdings,131 the   court   found  Aereo’s   argument   that   it  
was transmitting private, rather than public, performances per Cablevision “more  
plausible”  than  the  Plaintiff’s  argument  that  what  makes  a  transmission  “public”  is  
the intended audience of the initial broadcast, regardless of whether a user views a 
 
 121. See Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, No. 13-758, 2013 WL 4763414 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 
2013); Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 122. FilmOn X LLC, 2013 WL 4763414, at *1. 
 123. BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1144.  This case was decided after the S.D.N.Y. issued its 
Aereo decision, but before the Second Circuit decision was released. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1145. 
 126. Id. at 1146. 
 127. FilmOn X LLC, 2013 WL 4763414, at *13 (“FilmOn X transmits (i.e., communicates from 
mini-antenna through servers over the Internet to a user) the performance (i.e., an original over-the-air 
broadcast of a work copyrighted by one of the Plaintiffs) to members of the public (i.e., any person who 
accesses the FilmOn X service through its website or application) who receive the performance in 
separate places and at different times (i.e. at home at their computers or on their mobile devices).”). 
 128. Id. at *14. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Hearst Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-11649, 2013 WL 5604284 (D. Mass. Oct. 8, 2013) 
(denying a local television station’s preliminary injunction motion against Aereo). 
 131. Id. at *5.  
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unique copy.132  Although   the   court   seemed   to   rely   on   the   Second   Circuit’s  
rationale in Cablevision and Aereo, the court provided little clarity as to why it 
endorsed   this   interpretation.      The   court’s   only explicit reasoning was that 
interpreting the relevant performance as the copyrighted work would read the 
language  “performance  or  display”  out  of   the   statute,  which  would  be  contrary   to  
the   “‘canon   against   surplusage’   [requiring]   this   [c]ourt   to   give  meaning to every 
statutory  term  if  possible.”133  However, the court did not address how the statutory 
language  supports  the  use  of  “transmission”  and  “performance”  synonymously,  or  
why the use of a distinct copy is relevant.  Without more detailed reasoning, the 
opinion   provides   little   support   for   the   Second   Circuit’s   interpretation   of   the  
Transmit Clause. 
II.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S  INTERPRETATION OF THE TRANSMIT 
CLAUSE EVISCERATES THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT IN THE 
BROADCAST INDUSTRY AND BEYOND 
The  Second  Circuit’s  decision  to  uphold  its  interpretation  of  the  Transmit  Clause  
in Cablevision eviscerates the public performance right within the digital space and 
creates  a  gap  in  protection  for  copyright  owners.    The  court’s  interpretation  of  the  
Transmit Clause contradicts the statutory text, legislative history and traditional 
protection afforded by the Copyright Act.  By misconstruing the language of the 
Transmit Clause in this way, the Second Circuit has created a loophole in the public 
performance right, leaving copyright owners defenseless against copyright 
infringement within the digital realm. 
Although  the  Second  Circuit’s  Transmit  Clause  interpretation  was  established  in  
Cablevision, the decision to apply the Cablevision holding to Aereo significantly 
broadened the interpretation.  Instead of limiting its holding to the context and facts 
presented in Cablevision,134 the Second Circuit inappropriately applied it to 
virtually all methods of digital content delivery, something the court in Cablevision 
hesitated to do.135  Consequently,   the  court  virtually  eliminated  “public”   from  the  
Copyright Act in the digital realm, calling into question the ability of copyright law 
to sufficiently protect copyright owners in the digital environment.136 
 
 132. Id. at *6. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21–22, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 557 U.S. 946 (2009) (No. 08-448) (arguing that the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Cablevision “should not be understood to reach . . . other circumstances beyond those presented in the 
case” and that the court “resolved a narrow question about a discrete technology in the terms that it had 
been framed by the parties”). 
 135. The Second Circuit itself warned against a loose application of its Cablevision holding:  
“[t]his holding, we must emphasize, does not generally permit content delivery networks to avoid all 
copyright liability by making copies of each item of content and associating one unique copy with each 
subscriber to the network, or by giving their subscribers the capacity to make their own individual 
copies.”  Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 136. Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright Law—Part II, Caselaw:  Exclusive 
Rights on the Ebb? 1 (Colum. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Working Paper No. 
08158, 2008) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Recent Developments] (“Several US courts have narrowly 
37.3 LARKIN NOTE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2014  3:06 PM 
2014] THE DEMISE OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT IN THE DIGITAL REALM  423 
Part II.A will discuss how the Second Circuit misconstrued the Transmit Clause 
and the consequences for the broadcast television industry.  Part II.B will discuss 
the wide-ranging potential consequences for digital content delivery systems 
beyond the broadcast industry.  These consequences will be illustrated through 
hypothetical  case   studies  applying   the  Second  Circuit’s   technological  blueprint   to  
several business models. 
A.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION CREATES A GAP IN PROTECTION 
TRADITIONALLY CONFERRED ON BROADCASTERS 
The   Second   Circuit’s   interpretation   of   the   Transmit   Clause   creates   a   massive  
gap in the traditional protection for broadcasters under copyright law.  By 
disaggregating the audience, the Second Circuit has, in effect, rendered all 
individualized on-demand transmissions private and effectively eviscerated the 
public performance right.  The Second Circuit misconstrued the language of the 
statute and the intent of Congress, and reached an improper outcome as to a service 
functionally equivalent to cable television providers. 
1.  The Second Circuit Improperly Construed the Plain Language of the 
Transmit Clause 
The Transmit Clause defines what constitutes a public performance by 
transmission.137  As  the  Second  Circuit  noted,  the  Transmit  Clause  is  “not a model 
of   clarity.”138  The Second Circuit incorrectly interpreted multiple ambiguous 
phrases within the Transmit Clause, leading to the exclusion of individualized on-
demand  transmissions  from  the  definition  of  “public.” 
First, the Second Circuit misinterpreted  the  intent  of  the  phrase  “members  of  the  
public  capable  of   receiving.”     Focusing  on   the  phrase   “capable  of   receiving,”   the  
Second  Circuit  determined  that  the  definition  of  public  covered  “people  capable  of  
receiving   a   particular   ‘transmission’   or   ‘performance,’   and   not   of   the   potential  
audience   of   a   particular   ‘work.’”139  The   court   held   that   Cablevision’s   RS-DVR 
transmissions  were  not  made  “to  the  public”  because  the  copies  were  individualized  
to  particular  subscribers,  and  thus  only  one  person  was  “capable”  of  receiving  the  
transmission.140 
However,   the   language   “members   of   the   public”   indicates   that   Congress  
 
construed the reach of the exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, public performance and public 
display, thus putting into doubt their efficacy in the digital environment.  In particular, the Second 
Circuit’s recent decision in Cartoon Networks v. CSC Holdings, if followed, could substantially 
eviscerate the reproduction and public performance rights.”). 
 137. 17 U.S.C. §101 (2012) (“To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means . . . (2) to transmit or 
otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device 
or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it 
in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.”). 
 138. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 136. 
 139. Id. at 135. 
 140. Id. 
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intended to focus on each recipient of a particular transmission, which the Second 
Circuit seems to ignore.  Many commentators have agreed with this position, 
including  Professor  Jane  Ginsburg,  who  pointed  out  that  “[t]he  phrase  ‘members  of  
the   public   capable   of   receiving   the   performance’   is   not   intended   to   narrow   the  
universe  of  ‘the  public.’    On  the  contrary,  its  role  is  to  clarify  that  a  transmission is 
still   ‘to   the   public’   even   if   its   receipt   is   individualized.”141  Thus, individual 
recipients do   not   cease   being   “members of   the   public”   simply   because   they are 
“capable  of  receiving  the  performance”  one  at  a  time.142 
The  Copyright  Act’s  definition  of what  it  means  “to  perform  or  display  a  work  
‘publicly’”  is  divided  into  two  parts:  (1)  public  performance  in  the  more  traditional  
sense (i.e., in front of a crowd of individuals) and (2) transmission or 
communication of a performance of a work to the public. The Second Circuit 
improperly  construed  the  word  “it”  at  the  end  of  the  second  part  of  the  definition—
“whether   the   members   of   the   public   capable   of   receiving   the   performance   .   .   .  
receive   it”—by   erroneously   conflating   “transmission”   and   “performance”   to 
determine   that   “it”   was   the   transmission   of   the   performance   as   opposed   to   the  
performance of the underlying work.143 The   terms   “transmission”   and  
“performance”   are   distinct   within   the   statute,   and   “it”   here   refers   to   the  
performance.144  By treating the terms as synonymous, the Second Circuit 
improperly focused on the uniqueness of each transmission and individual copy, 
rather than on the performance of the work. A digital content provider could 
therefore avoid   the   term   “public”   altogether   by   creating   individualized 
transmissions from a unique copy; such a tactic would make only one member of 
the public capable of receiving that transmission.  However, this result would still 
be  erroneous  because  the  provider’s  act  would  result  in  a  private  transmission  of  a  
public  performance,  which  would  still  violate  the  broadcasters’  public  performance  
right.  As Judge Wu stated in Fox TV Stations v. BarryDriller Content Systems, 
“[v]ery  few  people  gather  around  their  oscilloscopes  to  admire  the  sinusoidal  waves  
of a television broadcast transmission.”145 
 
 141. See Ginsburg, Recent Developments, supra note 136, at 26; see also Jeffrey Malkan, The 
Public Performance Problem in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 89 OR. L. REV. 505, 532 
(2010) (“Switching the words ‘performance’ and ‘transmission’ changed the outcome of the case 
because there will be viewers who will be capable of receiving a performance of a network telecast 
(subscribers to Cablevision’s feed of HBO) but not capable of receiving particular transmissions of that 
performance (nonsubscribers to Cablevision’s RS-DVR service).  This is because nonsubscribers won’t 
have access to any RS-DVR copies, and even RS-DVR subscribers will have access only to their own 
copies.”); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.7.2 (3d ed. Supp. 2013). 
 142. Ginsburg, Recent Developments, supra note 136, at 26. 
 143. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 136 (“[W]e believe that when Congress speaks of 
transmitting a performance to the public, it refers to the performance created by the act of 
transmission.”). 
 144. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 141 (“The error in the Second Circuit’s construction of the 
transmit clause was to treat ‘transmissions’ and ‘performance’ as synonymous, where the Act clearly 
treats them as distinct—and different—operative terms.”); see also United States v. Am. Soc. of 
Composers, Authors, Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Because the electronic download 
itself involves no recitation, rendering, or playing of the musical work encoded in the digital 
transmission, we hold that such a download is not a performance of that work, as defined by § 101.”). 
 145. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144 (C.D. 
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Conflating  “transmission”  and  “performance”  also  clashes  with  the  remainder  of  
the   statute,   which   explicitly   includes   performances   to  members   of   the   public   “at  
different   times.”146  The  Second  Circuit’s   synonymous  use  of  “transmission”  and  
“performance”  writes   the   “at   different   times”   language  out   of   the   statute  because  
one transmission cannot be received at different times.147  Professor Jane Ginsburg 
has discussed this difference, noting  that  “[i]f  one  member  of  the  public  receives  an  
on-demand   transmission   of   a   performance   of   a   given   work   at   12   o’clock,   and  
another receives from the same transmission service an on-demand transmission of 
a  performance  of  the  same  work  at  1  o’clock,  only one person can receive each on-
demand   transmission.”148  A performance, on the other hand, can be received at 
different  times.    “Once  one  recognizes  that  it  is  not  possible  for  the  two  people  to  
receive  the  same  transmission  ‘at  different  times,’”  Professor Ginsburg concluded, 
“then  it  becomes  clear  that  the  ‘public’  character  of  the  transmission  cannot  turn  on  
capacity  to  receive  a  transmission.”149  This  logic  also  renders  the  Second  Circuit’s  
distinction between individual and common source copies irrelevant, because if 
members of the public have to receive the same particular transmission, all 
asynchronous transmissions would be excluded regardless.150 
Additionally,   the  Second  Circuit   seems   to   ignore   the  phrase  “by  means  of  any  
device  or  process,”  which  indicated  Congress’  intent  to  encompass  emerging  forms  
of technology.151  Both  Cablevision’s  RS-DVR  system  and  Aereo’s  retransmission  
service,  comprised  of  mini  antennas,  fall  under  “any  device  or  process.” 
In   sum,   the   Second   Circuit’s   interpretation   of   “public”   within   the   Transmit  
Clause erroneously focused on whether the transmissions were derived from a 
unique  source  copy  rather  than  on  whether  the  communication  was  to  “members  of  
the   public.”      By   disaggregating   the   audience,   the   Second   Circuit   has   created   a 
blueprint for intermediaries to send individualized on-demand transmissions of a 
performance to thousands of subscribers at different times without violating the 
public performance right.152  Furthermore, this blueprint could impact the 
distribution right and the display right because these rights also require that a work 
reach  “the  public.”153 
 
Cal. 2012). 
 146. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 147. See Jane C. Ginsburg, WNET v. Aereo:  The Second Circuit Persists in Poor (Cable)Vision, 
MEDIA INST. (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2013/042313.php. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. (“The individual/common source distinction is a red herring because a reading of the 
statute that requires members of the public to receive the same particular transmission would exclude all 
asynchronous transmissions no matter how shared the source.”). 
 151. 17 U.S.C. § 101.  This point is further supported by the legislative history.  See infra Part 
II.A.2. 
 152. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 697 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J., dissenting) 
(“Under Aereo’s theory, by using these individual antennas and copies, it may retransmit, for example, 
the Super Bowl ‘live’ to 50,000 subscribers and yet, because each subscriber has an individual antenna 
and a ‘unique recorded cop[y]’ of the broadcast, these are ‘private’ performances.  Of course, the 
argument makes no sense.  These are very much public performances.”). 
 153. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2010) (“to display the copyrighted work publicly”) (emphasis added); id. 
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2.    The  Legislative  History  Does  Not  Support  the  Second  Circuit’s  
Construction of the Transmit Clause 
The  Second  Circuit’s  reliance  on  the  “capable  of  receiving”  language within the 
clause  “whether  the  members  of  the  public  capable  of  receiving  the  performance  or  
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at 
different   times”154 is not only unpersuasive but also is unsupported by authority.  
Analysis   of   the   legislative   history   contradicts   the   Second   Circuit’s   statutory  
interpretation.  The Transmit Clause was added in order to clarify that it did not 
matter whether the people receiving the transmission did so at different times, in 
different places, or from one copy or individualized copies; rather, what matters is 
that the transmission was made by means of any device or process to members of 
the public.  Congressional reports accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976 stated 
that  a  “performance  made  available  by  transmission  to  the  public  at  large  is  ‘public’  
even though the recipients are not gathered in a single place, and even if there is no 
proof that any of the potential recipients was operating his receiving apparatus at 
the time of the  transmission.”155  It is thus clear that Congress was focused solely 
on  whether  “members  of  the  public”  were  receiving  a  performance  of  a  copyrighted  
work, irrespective of whether a transmission was generated from an individual or 
common source copy, or whether the members of the public viewed the 
performance at the same time or at different times.156 
The  Congressional  reports  also  clarified  the  scope  of  the  phrase  “by  any  device  
or   process,”   indicating   Congress’   intent   to   include   transmissions   created   by   new 
forms of media technology: 
The  definition  of  “transmit”  . . . is broad enough to include all conceivable forms and 
combinations of wires and wireless communications media, including but by no 
means limited to radio and television broadcasting as we know them.  Each and every 
method by which the images or sounds comprising a performance or display are 
picked  up  and  conveyed  is  a  “transmission,”  and  if  the  transmission  reaches  the  public  
in any form, the case comes within the scope of clauses (4) or (5) of section 106.157 
Although   the   Congressional   reports   directly   contradict   the   Second   Circuit’s  
statutory interpretation, the court attempted to justify its interpretation by 
misconstruing   the   legislative   history.      The   Second   Circuit   focused   on   Congress’  
requirement that performances must be public to be liable, and conversely that 
 
§ 106(5) (“to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public”) (emphasis added). 
 154. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
 155. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64–65 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 61 (1975).  
 156. Several courts have come to a similar conclusion.  See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd 
Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a performance of a work was public, even 
though each individual received it via separate transmission); Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller 
Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144–45 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“[T]he concern is with the 
performance of the copyrighted work, irrespective of which copy of the work the transmission is made 
from. . . .  Thus, Cablevision’s focus on the uniqueness of the individual copy from which a transmission 
is made is not commanded by the statute.”); On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 
777 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 157. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64–65; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 61.  
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private performances are exempted from liability. In doing so, the court concluded:  
“[t]his  limitation  also  applies  to  performances  created  by  a  ‘transmission,’  since,  as  
the Cablevision court noted, if Congress intended all transmissions to be public 
performances,   the   Transmit   Clause   would   not   have   contained   the   phrase   ‘to   the  
public.’”158  The   court’s   support   for   this   conclusion   is   its   determination   that  
“Congress   would   have   certainly   wished to avoid adopting language that would 
make millions of Americans copyright infringers because they transmitted 
broadcast television programs from their personal rooftop antennas to their own 
television  sets.”159  This analogy is inapposite, because Americans in this situation 
would  not  be  transmitting  the  performance  to  “members  of  the  public”  and  would  
thus not be liable for copyright infringement. 
3.    The  Second  Circuit’s  Interpretation  Is  Incorrect  Because  Aereo  Provides  a  
Service Functionally Equivalent to a Cable Television Provider 
The background of the Transmit Clause reveals that the outcome in Aereo was 
contrary to the traditional protection of copyright law and the intent of Congress.  
The  result  of  the  Second  Circuit’s  interpretation  is  that  a cable provider who relays 
a real-time   signal   to   a   user’s   home   through   the   traditional  mode  of   coaxial   cable  
must pay retransmission fees; meanwhile, a cable provider who first relays the 
signal through a separate server and creates an individualized copy of the work is 
exempt from those fees.  By applying its Cablevision precedent to Aereo, treating 
“transmission”   and   “performance”   synonymously,   the   Second   Circuit   created   a  
loophole in which the “public”  element can be avoided through an individualized 
delivery method.  Until the court recognizes that the determination of copyright 
infringement in this context must be delivery-agnostic, there will be a massive gap 
in protection afforded by the Copyright Act.  As Judge Chin observed in his 
dissent,   Aereo’s   technology platform is an over-engineered attempt to avoid 
copyright liability.160 
4.    The  Second  Circuit’s  Volitional  Act  Requirement Allows Providers to 
Escape Copyright Liability Altogether 
In Cablevision and Aereo, the Second Circuit also created a way for 
retransmission services to avoid direct liability for copyright infringement by 
providing automated services.  Although the Second Circuit focused on the 
definition  of  “public,”  rather  than  “perform,”  both  cases  established  a  volitional  act  
requirement for direct liability.  According to the Second Circuit, in order to 
“perform,”   or   be   the   party   who   “made”   the   copies,   the   party   must   take   some  
volitional action.161  In both Cablevision and Aereo, the Second Circuit observed 
 
 158. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 
896 (2014) (mem.). 
 159. Id. at 694 n.18. 
 160. Id. at 697. 
 161. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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that it was not the services but rather their  subscribers  who  “made”   the  copies.162  
The court looked to the control that the subscriber exercised over each service, 
ultimately finding that because both services were fully automated, neither service 
took the volitional action necessary to have  “made”  the  copies.163  This requirement 
is seemingly without authority. 
Additionally, such a requirement allows services to circumvent not only direct 
liability because they did not make the copy, but also contributory liability.  
Although contributory liability was not at issue in either case, the effects of this 
interpretation are worth noting for future application of this precedent.  Absent an 
actionable claim for direct copyright infringement, there can be no claims of 
contributory infringement.164  Although the issue of contributory liability was not 
litigated, the Ninth Circuit recently ruled that subscriber-made time-shifting copies 
were fair use.165  If the Second Circuit also finds that time-shifting copies are fair 
use, there would be no direct infringement by the user—and thus no contributory 
infringement by anyone—in such cases.166  Thus, a service with a fully automated 
system allowing a subscriber to make copies could potentially escape copyright 
liability altogether. 
B.  RE-ENGINEERING INFRINGING INTERMEDIARY BUSINESS MODELS IN LIGHT 
OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION  
Not only does statutory and economic analysis reveal an illogical result, but the 
Second   Circuit’s   holdings   in   Cablevision and Aereo also have the potential to 
threaten industries beyond broadcast television.  As Fox stated in its petition for 
writ of certiorari following the Cablevision ruling,  “[t]he  Second  Circuit’s  tortured  
reading of the public performance right will have profoundly destabilizing effects 
on the emerging marketplace for services that perform works on demand. . . .  Any 
company with a digital copy of a work can readily avail itself of this gaping 
loophole.”167  The Second Circuit has created a technological roadmap for 
intermediary service providers that will seriously undermine copyright 
 
 162. See WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 689–90; Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130–33. 
 163. In the Cablevision district court opinion, Judge Chin rejected the argument that the user, not 
the service, “made” the copies because Cablevision “actively participates” in the playback process 
through its operation and computer servers facilitating playback after the user presses the remote.  See 
Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), 
rev’d sub nom. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 121.  However, given discussion of the issue within the 
Cablevision and Aereo opinions, it seems likely that a fully automated system controlled by a subscriber 
might successfully evade copyright liability under Second Circuit precedent.  See WNET, Thirteen, 712 
F.3d at 689–90; Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130–33. 
 164. See Greenspan v. Random House, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 206, 219 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d, No. 
12-1594, 2012 WL 5188792 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1811 (2013). 
 165. Fox Broad. Co. Inc. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d, 
723 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 166. The fair use defense would likely be strengthened by analogy to time-shifting under Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 167. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *36–37, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 
557 U.S. 946 (2009) (No. 08-448). 
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protection.168 
Three  essential  holdings  from  the  Second  Circuit’s  decisions  in  Cablevision and 
Aereo function as a blueprint for new business models providing digital content 
delivery to evade liability:169  (1) a transitory buffer copy does not constitute an 
infringing   copy   because   it   is   not   “fixed,”170 and thus, when gathering content, a 
service  can  avoid  creating  a  “copy”  by  first  running  the  content  through  a  transitory  
buffer stage; (2) the party that causes the copies to be made is the one that exercises 
“volitional   conduct,”171 meaning that, in a fully automated service in which a 
subscriber   elects   to   copy   and   play   back   the   content,   the   subscriber   “makes”   the  
copy and (3) transmissions made from a unique source copy stored in a 
personalized portion of a central server are private, because the potential audience 
of each transmission is only one person.172  Following this blueprint, any service 
with large servers of personalized storage space and an ability to collect and 
transcode information individually could transmit copyrighted works to thousands 
of subscribers without ever paying a cent to copyright owners. 
While creating such a technologically inefficient system may once have been 
precluded by high costs of storage space, the ubiquity of cloud storage and low cost 
hard drives removes such limitations.  Additionally, the use of automated systems 
to execute subscriber requests is the norm in many industries, likely benefiting the 
service’s   operation.      Thus,   assuming   that   a   service   can   circumvent   the   structural  
impediments involved in disaggregating the audience,173 there are few obstacles to 
executing the blueprint. 
To illustrate the perverse consequences of the Second Circuit’s   decisions,   this  
Note   will   apply   the   general   principles   of   the   Second   Circuit’s   Cablevision and 
Aereo decisions to hypothetically re-engineer several business models, taken from 
previously decided copyright cases in which courts have granted protection to 
copyright owners.174  Applying these general principles will reveal the loophole 
that the Second Circuit created for business models seeking to circumvent 
copyright  liability.     This  experiment  illustrates  how  the  Second  Circuit’s  holdings  
 
 168. See also Mary Rasenberger & Christine Pepe, Copyright Enforcement and Online File 
Hosting Services:  Have Courts Struck the Proper Balance?, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 627, 693 
(2012) (“The ability to hold a service directly liable for publicly performing copyrighted works online 
has . . . been severely curtailed by the potential loophole created by the Cablevision decision and its 
recent progeny, Aero [sic].”). 
 169. The “fixation” and “volitional conduct” requirements were not the central focus of either case 
because the broadcasters elected not to pursue a claim for violation of their reproduction right.  
However, these are important elements of the blueprint to ensure that intermediary services could 
circumvent not just the public performance right, but both relevant exclusive rights. 
 170. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 134–35. 
 173. In order to successfully follow the blueprint, the service must have access to content, as well 
as an ability to gather and buffer that content in a way that creates individual source copies for each 
subscriber.  Additionally, like any online service, it would need to establish a subscriber base. 
 174. The issues in each case and the applicable portions of the Copyright Act vary.  This does not 
affect the analysis:  the purpose of this exercise is to see the results of the blueprint proposition not only 
on the public performance right, but throughout copyright law. 
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could distort traditional copyright law, allowing digital content providers to not 
only evade liability for publicly performing, but also for publicly displaying, 
distributing or reproducing content. 
1.  Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc. 
In Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., the Associated Press 
(“AP”)   brought   suit   against   Meltwater   U.S.   Holdings,   Inc.   (“Meltwater”),   an  
Internet media monitoring service, for direct and contributory copyright 
infringement  for  publishing  portions  of  AP’s  copyrighted news stories.175  A central 
component  of  AP’s  revenue  has  been  the  licensing  fees  it  collects  to  publish  all  or  
excerpts of its articles on the Internet.176 
Meltwater   collected   excerpts   of   AP’s   published   news   articles   by   using  
“crawlers,”  or automated computer programs, to scan the Internet for news content 
and   “scrape,”   or   copy,   the   content   from   the   web.177  After scraping the content, 
Meltwater indexed each article to allow subscribers to perform ad hoc searches of 
the content or set up standing search queries that were conducted automatically on 
a recurring basis.178  Meltwater then delivered the requested content to the 
subscriber,   typically  providing   the  headline  of   the  article,   the  article’s   source  and  
hyperlink, a verbatim excerpt of the opening text of the article, and a verbatim 
excerpt   of   the   “Hit   Sentence,”   or   sentence   containing   the   subscriber’s   searched  
keywords.179  Subscribers (primarily businesses, government agencies and 
nonprofit organizations) could archive their search results by saving them in a 
personal  archive  stored  on  Meltwater’s  database.180 
Although Meltwater did not dispute that it was taking copyrighted content from 
AP,181 it   argued   that  copying  AP’s  articles  was  protected  by   the   fair   use  doctrine  
because  Meltwater’s  purpose  was   to   serve as a search engine and news reporting 
service.182  The  S.D.N.Y.  rejected  this  argument,  finding  that  “Meltwater’s  business  
model relies on the systematic copying of protected expression and the sale of 
collections of those copies in reports that compete directly with the copyright 
owner  and  that  owner’s  licensees  and  that  deprive  that  owner  of  a  stream  of  income  
to  which  it  is  entitled.”183  Ultimately,  the  court  refused  to  allow  Meltwater  “to free 
ride on the costly news gathering coverage work performed by other 
 
 175. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540-41 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013).  Although AP exerted multiple claims in the suit, the foregoing analysis will focus on direct and 
contributory copyright infringement. 
 176. Id. at 542 (noting that AP’s digital license agreements and commercial clients account for 
more than $75 million of AP’s annual gross revenue). 
 177. Id. at 542–44. 
 178. Id. at 544. 
 179. Id. at 544–45. 
 180. Id. at 546. 
 181. Id. at 541. 
 182. Id.  In addition to its fair use defense, Meltwater exerted defenses of implied license, 
copyright misuse, estoppel and laches.  See id. 
 183. Id. at 561. 
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organizations.”184 
Although the S.D.N.Y. made clear that Meltwater was engaging in copyright 
infringement  by  taking  “the  fruit  of  AP’s  labor  for  its  own  profit,”185 Meltwater’s  
technological platform could be re-engineered to provide its subscribers with the 
same service while evading copyright liability. 
In   its  original   system,  Meltwater’s  crawlers  automatically   scanned   the   Internet  
to collect news content, indexed the content to make it searchable, and then allowed 
subscribers to search the index for content containing certain keywords.186  
Applying the blueprint, Meltwater could re-engineer its service to consist of 
thousands of separate crawlers, each responsible for content collection for a 
particular subscriber.  To make a search query, a subscriber would first request that 
content be captured in conjunction with particular keywords.  This request would 
trigger one or more crawlers to be assigned to the subscriber.  The crawlers would 
then   automatically   scan   the   Internet   to   collect   the   subscriber’s   requested content, 
which would be sent through a primary buffer process in which a transitory buffer 
copy  would  be  created.    Afterwards,  the  content  would  be  sent  to  Meltwater’s  hard  
drive,  where  a  copy  would  be  saved  to  the  subscriber’s  personalized  folder.  When 
the subscriber is ready to access the news content, Meltwater would create a news 
report from the individual copy, which would be displayed to the subscriber at the 
moment of delivery.  No other subscriber would ever be able to access that content, 
even if they searched for news containing the same keywords as another subscriber. 
Using this redesigned technology platform, Meltwater could escape 
infringement  of  AP’s  reproduction  right,  because  the  transitory  buffer  copy  would  
not be fixed and because the subscriber, not Meltwater, would be responsible for 
making   the  copy.     Since  Meltwater’s  system  was   fully  automated  and   initiated   in  
response   to   a   subscriber’s   request,   Meltwater   would   not   have   exercised   the  
“volitional   conduct”   necessary   to   be   liable   for direct copyright infringement.  
Meltwater  would  also  not  violate  AP’s  public  display  or  distribution  right  because  
the news report would be made from an individualized copy associated with only 
one subscriber.  Thus, the potential audience of the content would only be one 
person. 
After re-engineering   Meltwater’s   technology   in   accordance   with   the   Second  
Circuit’s   blueprint,   Meltwater   would   be   able   to   provide   the   same   service   to  
subscribers with a different result under the law.  Simply by making a few changes 
to its content delivery method, Meltwater could not only free itself from all 
copyright  liability,  but  also  catch  a  “free ride on the costly news gathering coverage 
work  performed  by  other  organizations.”187 
2.  Atlantic Recording v. XM Satellite Radio 
In 2007, several recording companies brought suit against XM Satellite Radio 
 
 184. Id. at 553. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 544–45. 
 187. Id. 
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(“XM  Radio”)  for  operating  a  digital  download  subscription  service  that  distributed 
copyrighted works outside the scope of the broadcast license.188 
XM Radio provided a subscription service using copyrighted songs from the 
record companies in its programming.189  Although the record companies owned 
the rights to the majority of the content, XM Radio had a compulsory license, as a 
digital satellite broadcasting service, to use the copyrighted content subject to a few 
conditions.190 
In 2006, in addition to its typical service, XM Radio released a digital download 
service  operated  through  an  “XM  +  MP3”  player.  This service gave subscribers the 
ability to record, retain and create a library of song recordings from XM Radio 
broadcasts.191  When songs were transmitted during programming, the XM + MP3 
player automatically created a short-term buffer copy, which allowed subscribers to 
record  the  whole  song  at  any  time  during  the  song’s  playback  or  pre-select a song 
from published programming schedules.192 
The   recording   companies   brought   suit,   alleging   that   XM   Radio’s   activities  
violated the terms of the compulsory   license  as  well  as   the   recording  companies’  
reproduction and distribution rights.  Although the S.D.N.Y. focused its analysis on 
whether XM Radio was protected by the Audio Home Recording Act, the court 
determined that XM Radio violated its license by acting as a commercial content 
delivery provider without authorization.193  Recognizing the commercial benefit 
that XM Radio received through its XM + MP3 players, the court pointed out that 
XM Radio was only paying fees as a broadcaster, while acting as a distributor by 
making music available and allowing users to record well beyond the time when 
the song originally played.194  The  court  held  that  this  conduct  was  contrary  to  “the  
fundamental tenet of copyright law that all who derive value from a copyrighted 
 
 188. Atl. Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 3733, 2007 WL 136186, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2007).  The recording companies brought nine causes of action, including 
infringement of distribution and reproduction rights, violation of license, contributory copyright 
infringement and unfair competition.  Id.  In its defense, XM Radio asserted statutory immunity under 
the Audio Home Recording Act of the Copyright Act because the XM + MP3 player was a digital audio 
recording device.  Id.  However, while the court agreed that the XM + MP3 player was a digital audio 
recording device, XM Radio was not immunized because the recording companies’ claim was for 
actions taken as a satellite radio broadcaster, not a digital audio recording device provider.  Id. at *8. 
 189. Id. at *2. 
 190. Id. at *6; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012).  The compulsory license permitted XM 
Radio to “perform sound recordings publicly by means of a subscription digital audio transmission.”  
Restrictions on the license prohibited satellite radio providers from providing an interactive service, 
publishing its programing schedules prior to broadcast or playing songs by the same artist too 
frequently.  See Atl. Recording Corp., 2007 WL 136186, at *6. 
 191. Atl. Recording Corp., 2007 WL 136186, at *2.  The XM + MP3 player was a “special 
receiver” that differed from ordinary XM radios by adding features that allowed subscribers to do more 
than merely listen to programming.  Id. 
 192. Id.  XM Radio also controlled much of the functionality of the XM + MP3 player, including 
the initial activation, functionality of each player,and determining which songs users could and could not 
save.  Id. 
 193. Id. at *6. 
 194. Id. at *7. 
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work  should  pay  for  that  use.”195 
To ensure that all of the Aereo requirements are met, XM Radio could first 
confirm  that  each  subscriber’s  XM  +  MP3  player  is  equipped  with  a  mini  antenna  
capable of capturing retransmitted   content   from   XM   Radio’s   satellites.196  
Subscribers would select particular songs that they wanted to save.  For every song 
that is   retransmitted  by   the   satellites,   each   subscriber’s  XM  +  MP3  player  would  
capture the signal (a service that XM Radio typically provides).  Once the signal 
was captured, the stream would be transcoded and a buffer copy created.197  From 
the buffer copy, a unique  copy  would  be  stored  in  XM  Radio’s  digital  storage  space  
within   the   subscriber’s   personalized   directory.198  Upon   the   subscriber’s   request,  
XM Radio could transmit the song from the unique copy. 
Following these steps to conform to the Aereo-style buffer copy, user-initiated 
automation and individualized copy mechanisms set out in the blueprint, XM Radio 
could successfully re-engineer its technology platform in a way that evades 
copyright  liability.    XM  Radio’s  compulsory  license  permits  it  to  broadcast content 
publicly through digital satellite radio transmission, but it would not necessarily 
permit retransmission from the storage space to the subscriber.199  Thus, to avoid 
liability for violating the public performance right, it is still important that XM 
Radio send private transmissions to a potential audience of only one subscriber. 
Hypothetically re-engineering the XM + MP3 player in light of Cablevision and 
Aereo leads to incongruous legal results for two services that provide an 
indistinguishable experience to consumers.  Furthermore, by applying this 
technological  blueprint,  XM  Radio  would  evade  one  of  S.D.N.Y.’s  stated  tenets  of  
copyright  law  by  “deriv[ing]  value  from  a  copyrighted  work”  without  “paying  for  
that  use.”200 
3.  Infinity Broadcasting Corporation v. Kirkwood 
Media Dial-Up  (“Dial-Up”)  was  a  pre-Internet service that allowed subscribers 
to listen to live radio over the phone.  Dial-Up enabled subscribers (mostly radio 
stations, advertisers, entertainment companies and others interested in scouting 
talent or verifying the broadcast of scheduled advertisements) to listen to 
broadcasts from cities around the country.201  In order to do this, Dial-Up placed 
 
 195. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 196. Id. at *2.  Since each XM + MP3 player is already formatted to receive XM radio broadcasts, 
it is likely that mini antennas are already present in the device. 
 197. Although there is no set timeframe for what constitutes a “fixed” copy, a blueprint should 
adhere to the Second Circuit’s holding that copying 1.2 seconds of programming at any time was not 
sufficiently fixed.  See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 198. If a subscriber did not request that a particular song be saved, the stream would be played 
back as a regular satellite radio broadcast retransmission.  See Atl. Recording Corp., 2007 WL 136186, 
at *2. 
 199. See id. at *6 (observing that 17 U.S.C. § 114 generally permits satellite radio services to 
perform sound recordings publicly, but there are restrictions under § 114(d)(2) that would likely be 
violated by retransmitting the recordings from storage). 
 200. See Atl. Recording Corp., 2007 WL 136186, at *7. 
 201. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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radio receivers in multiple cities that contained circuit boards connected to specific 
telephone lines.202  When a receiver captured over-the-air broadcasts, it transmitted 
them into the phone line so that subscribers could call and listen to a particular 
broadcast.203  Subscribers exercised complete control over which station the 
receiver was tuned to by changing its setting via a touchtone phone.204 
Infinity  Broadcasting  Corporation  (“Infinity”)  was  a  media  company  that  owned  
a large number of radio stations in the markets where Dial-Up had placed its 
receivers.      Some   of   Infinity’s   stations   were   syndicated, or broadcast in other 
markets for a fee, and some offered listen lines, which were station-specific 
versions of Dial-Up’s  service.205  In 1998, Infinity brought suit against Dial-Up for 
retransmitting its copyrighted material.206 
Dial-Up claimed that although it was retransmitting copyrighted material, its 
activity was protected by the fair use defense.207  The Second Circuit nevertheless 
held that Dial-Up’s   retransmissions   of   the   copyrighted   broadcasts   infringed   on  
Infinity’s   copyrighted   content,   and   that the retransmissions were not fair use 
because  they  were  not  transformative:    “[Dial-Up] creates nothing and advances no 
body  of   knowledge  or   criticism.      [It]   simply   takes   Infinity’s  unaltered  broadcasts  
and  markets  them  to  a  specific  clientele.”208 
Using technology available today, Dial-Up could easily re-engineer its service to 
avoid  infringing  on  Infinity’s  copyrighted  content.     Instead  of  having  one  receiver  
in each city, Dial-Up could install mini-antenna boards holding multiple antennas 
in each city.  Subscribers could then remotely select which programming they 
would like to listen to, which would send a signal to Dial-Up’s  server  to  assign  the  
subscriber to a particular antenna within the desired market.  The antenna would 
capture the over-the-air broadcast, generate a buffer copy and create an 
individualized copy from which the radio retransmission stream would be 
generated.  Through such re-engineering, Dial-Up would conform to the blueprint 
and thus evade copyright liability. 
Once again, re-engineering in light of Cablevision and Aereo would apply a 
different legal treatment to a technology that generates the same results for 
consumers.    Despite  its  new  “legality,”  the  hypothetical  re-engineering of Dial-Up 
would still, in the words of the Second Circuit,  “simply  take[]  Infinity’s  unaltered  
broadcasts  and  market[]  them  to  a  specific  clientele.”209 
While it is difficult to imagine a circumstance in which a telephone listen-line 
service would be a desirable way to listen to radio broadcasts today, application of 
the   Second   Circuit’s   loophole   to   older   media   illustrates   the   far-reaching 
repercussions of this interpretation.  The blueprint could be applied to a modern 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 107. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 111–12. 
 209. Id. 
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day version of Dial-Up, in which an Internet service capturing over-the-air 
broadcasts offers this programming to subscribers online. 
4.  WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc. 
ivi, Inc. was a service that captured over-the-air television content and 
retransmitted the live content to subscribers over the Internet.210  Subscribers 
downloaded   ivi’s   “TV  player,”  which   enabled   them   to  watch   the   content   live   on  
any Internet-capable device.211  Subscribers could pay an additional fee to access 
functions such as recording, pausing, fast-forwarding and rewinding.212  In WPIX, 
Inc. v. ivi, Inc.   (“ivi”),   major   television   broadcasters   brought   suit   against   ivi   for  
streaming copyrighted television content live over the Internet. 213  While ivi did 
not dispute that the broadcasters owned the copyright in the content, it argued that 
its service was nevertheless permitted because it was a cable system entitled to a 
compulsory license under § 111 of the Copyright Act.214 
The   Second   Circuit   held   that   ivi’s   Internet   retransmission   service   did   not  
constitute   a   “cable   system”   under   the   Copyright   Act, and ivi was therefore not 
entitled to a compulsory license.  It thus could not legally continue to retransmit 
copyrighted television content to its subscribers.215  The court relied heavily on the 
legislative history behind the compulsory licensing scheme, concluding that 
Congress’   intent   was   not   to   extend   the   compulsory   cable   license   to   Internet  
retransmissions.216 
From   a   subscriber   perspective,   ivi’s   business   model   and   service   was   nearly  
identical   to  Aereo’s.     Yet,  because  ivi  did  not  design  its  technological platform to 
conform   to   the   Second   Circuit’s   blueprint   (as   Aereo   did),   the court held that its 
actions constituted infringement.  Both ivi and Aereo collected over-the-air 
broadcast television content and retransmitted it via the Internet to thousands of 
subscribers, yet these two services were treated differently under the law in the 
same circuit.  Perhaps the most perverse  example  of  the  Second  Circuit’s  blueprint,  
this result was achieved without any hypothetical re-engineering at all.  Ultimately, 
ivi’s  positioning  as  a  retransmission  service,  as  opposed  to  Aereo’s  positioning  as  a  




 210. WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1585 
(2013). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id.  
 214. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012). 
 215. ivi, 691 F.3d at 277. 
 216. Id. at 282. 
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III.  COURTS SHOULD ADOPT JUDGE  CHIN’S  APPROACH AND 
APPLY TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF COPYRIGHT LAW TO NEW 
TECHNOLOGY 
The   Second   Circuit’s   decisions   in   Cablevision and Aereo have created a 
loophole in traditional copyright protection.  As a result, any digital content 
delivery service can create unauthorized copies of copyrighted works and transmit 
them to thousands of people without engaging in any infringing act.  This outcome 
essentially eviscerates the public performance, public distribution and public 
display rights for any content within the digital realm. 
On January 10, 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Aereo.217  While 
the case is an opportunity for the Supreme Court to address interpretations of the 
public performance right, the issues of fixation and volition are not included in the 
questions presented to the Court.218  Thus, multiple elements of the blueprint are 
still likely to be at issue even after the Supreme Court renders a decision, allowing 
digital content providers to continue to evade copyright liability by re-engineering 
their business models. 
This Part will discuss how the courts can close this loophole, and what content 
owners can do to protect themselves in the interim.  Part III.A will propose that 
courts  adopt  Judge  Chin’s  interpretation  of  fixation,  volition  and  “public”  under  the  
Transmit Clause in order to close the loophole.  Part III.B will discuss how the 
courts can resolve future problems by striking a proper balance between copyright 
protection and technological innovation.  Part III.C will discuss steps that copyright 
owners can take to exercise their rights and protect their content. 
A.  COURTS SHOULD FOCUS ON THE POTENTIAL AUDIENCE OF A PARTICULAR 
WORK AND PRIORITIZE FUNCTION OVER FORM 
While it is unclear which issues (beyond public performance) the Supreme 
Court will address in its Aereo decision, to the extent that the Court interprets the 
Transmit Clause, it should follow the approach proposed by Judge Chin’s  dissent  in  
Aereo.219  By disaggregating the audience, the Second Circuit provided digital 
delivery   services   with   a   loophole,   allowing   them   to   avoid   performing   “publicly”  
simply by changing their delivery method.  Specifically, digital delivery services 
could send individualized transmissions to subscribers, without regard to how many 
total subscribers received the same source transmission.  This sets the stage for 
 
 217. See American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www. 
scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/american-broadcasting-companies-inc-v-aereo-inc (last visited Mar. 15, 
2014). 
 218. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461 (petition 
granted Jan. 10, 2014), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/ 
ABCvAereo_11Oct13.pdf. 
 219. The proper approach was also adopted by the Central District of California and the D.C. 
District Court in the FilmOn X cases.  See Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, No. 13-758, 2013 
WL 4763414 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013); Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. 
Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
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services to structure their technical delivery systems according to the Cablevision 
and Aereo blueprint in order to retransmit copyrighted works to the public without 
facing  copyright  liability.    Applying  Judge  Chin’s  approach  would  switch  the  focus  
to the potential audience capable of receiving the same source performance, rather 
than elevating “form   over   substance”   by   allowing   services   to   engineer   their  
technological platforms to avoid liability.220  Therefore,   under   Judge   Chin’s  
approach,  despite  the  technically  individualized  copies  and  transmissions,  Aereo’s  
transmissions  would  be  made  “to  the public.” 
Given its broad application beyond the public performance right and television 
broadcast environment, the loophole for digital delivery content providers will 
likely   continue   to   exist   after   the   Supreme   Court’s   Aereo decision.  As suits are 
brought against new technologies that push the limits of copyright protection, 
federal courts will thus have to determine the extent to which copyright owners 
should be protected within the digital realm.  In order to determine whether a 
performance, display or distribution  should  be  considered  “public”  under  copyright  
law, several legal commentators have suggested that courts consider certain 
standard factors that can be applied to varying situations.  Noting that decisions 
have  often   relied  on   “the   court’s   chosen  degree  of   focus  or   quantum   time   span,”  
commentator Vivian Kim has suggested that courts should consider three key 
factors  in  determining  whether  a  place  is  “public”:    privacy,  control  and  the  nature  
of the place.221  In  other  words,  “[a] place would be considered  ‘public’  if  there  was  
no privacy afforded to the consumers, no consumer control over the method or 
mode of consumption, and if the place was commonly known to be open to the 
public.”222  These factors are flexible enough to apply to both physical and digital 
environments.     A  definition  of  “public”   that  can  be  applied   to  different   situations  
would help bring predictability to this area of the law, even as new technologies 
continue to enter the market.  Without debating what factors should be considered, 
the broad takeaway is that courts should establish a high-level, well-rounded 
approach  when   evaluating  whether   services   are   “public,”   one   that   is   flexible   but  
consistently applied to varying forms of technology. 
Another issue in applying traditional copyright   law  to  Aereo’s   technology  was  
that the Second Circuit focused too heavily on form over function, a fact that Judge 
Chin noted in his dissent.  The outcome of the case was thus based on how the 
technology was configured, rather than how Aereo functioned.  Each party framed 
Aereo’s   service   differently.      Aereo   positioned   itself   as   a   hardware  manufacturer,  
providing a time-shifting device that allowed subscribers to watch and record 
television programming as they wished, much like using a VCR.223  Aereo would 
 
 220. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 693 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 
896 (2014) (mem.). 
 221. Vivian I. Kim, The Public Performance Right in the Digital Age:  Cartoon Network LP v. 
CSC Holdings, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 263, 290–91 (2009).  Although Vivian Kim specifically 
discussed whether performances or transmissions were public, these factors can be applied to each 
exclusive right that requires content to reach “the public” for liability. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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not be liable if it merely provided customers with a time-shifting device.224  The 
broadcasters, on the other hand, framed Aereo as a subscription service providing 
television transmissions via the Internet.225  Under this framing, Aereo would be 
liable for publicly performing and would also be disqualified from the compulsory 
licensing scheme.226  Thus, because Aereo added two technological elements to its 
system, it avoided liability as an Internet retransmission subscription service, even 
though it was providing a functionally equivalent service.  If courts prioritize 
function over form when applying copyright law to unfamiliar technology, they can 
prevent the circumvention of copyright liability via over-engineering. 
Following  Judge  Chin’s  approach  of  prioritizing function over form would focus 
the   outcome   of   each   case   on   a   content   provider’s   service   rather   than   on   its  
technological   platform.      Using   Judge   Chin’s   Super   Bowl   example,227 in 
determining whether a service was performing publicly, a court would focus on the 
fact that Aereo transmitted the Super Bowl—the same source performance—live to 
50,000 people, rather than that each transmission was created from an 
individualized copy.  This new emphasis would continue to protect copyright 
owners in accordance with traditional doctrine, even as technology advances.228  As 
Judge  Chin  pointed  out,  even  though  delivery  “emanates  from  a  distinct  copy  of  a  
program  uniquely  associated”  with  one   subscriber   for  exclusive  viewing,   it   is  not  
private.229  Therefore, analysis of copyright infringement must be delivery-agnostic 
in order to provide copyright owners with the protection conferred on them under 
the Copyright Act.230 
B. COURTS SHOULD SUPPORT COPYRIGHT OWNERS AGAINST SERVICES 
DESIGNED TO DISSEMINATE CONTENT BY EXPLOITING THE WORKS OF OTHERS 
A   major   question   underlying   this   dispute   is   whether   “copyright   prerogatives  
should  yield  to  technological  preferences.”231  Copyright law seeks both to reward 
content creators and encourage creation for the good of society.  It could be argued 
that   Judge   Chin’s   approach   to   the   Transmit   Clause   and   Aereo prioritizes the 
 
 224. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 225. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 125. 
 226. See WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1585 (2013). 
 227. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 693 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J., dissenting), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) (mem.). 
 228. See also Daniel L. Brenner & Stephen H. Kay, ABC v. Aereo, Inc.:  When Is Internet 
Distribution a “Public Performance” Under Copyright Law?, 24 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 12, 15 
(2012) (“In a world of digital server technology, why should infringement turn on whether the defendant 
uses a less efficient, separate copy system than using a common master copy for each customer 
requesting one?”). 
 229.  Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 622–23 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121. 
 230. Implementing this approach might also avoid such contradictory results as the Second 
Circuit’s ivi and Aereo decisions, which came to different conclusions regarding the liability of two 
services that both captured over-the-air television and retransmitted that content to thousands of users.  
See WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d 676; ivi, 691 F.3d at 277. 
 231. See Ginsburg, Recent Developments, supra note 136, at 2. 
37.3 LARKIN NOTE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2014  3:06 PM 
2014] THE DEMISE OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT IN THE DIGITAL REALM  439 
protection of copyright owners over the promotion of technological innovation.  
After  all,  the  hard  work  and  innovation  of  Aereo’s  over-engineering, in accordance 
with Cablevision, provided consumers with access to television that was less 
expensive and more widely accessible than cable providers offered.  To enjoin 
Aereo could stifle innovation, disincentivizing other companies from developing 
technology that could improve the lives of many.  Commentators have also noted 
the costs of assigning rights to content owners at the expense of companies that 
provide less costly or more efficient modes of dissemination.232  One such cost is 
“the  use  of  intellectual  property  rights  to  block or delay the market entry of threats 
to   intellectual   property   owners.”233  Professor Timothy Wu has discussed how 
industry incumbents can use copyright law as a tool to foreclose new methods of 
dissemination and preserve market dominance.234  This result would deprive 
society of valuable technological services. 
Although shutting down Aereo could disincentivize companies from developing 
new modes of dissemination, a narrow construction of the Copyright Act could also 
stifle innovation by disincentivizing the production of new content.  At the very 
least, lost revenue resulting from increased access to content could limit copyright 
owners’  ability  to  invest  in  new  and  quality  content.235  Since broadcasters are both 
disseminators and creators, this would also discourage creation.  A primary purpose 
of copyright law is to grant creators control over their creations in exchange for 
allowing the public to benefit from their creations.236  While Aereo and similar 
services create useful technology, these services are dependent on copyright 
owners’   creation   of   content   to   function.237  Thus, in cases concerning services 
“designed   solely   to   exploit   someone   else’s   copyrighted   work,”238 the economic 
rights of copyright owners should be prioritized.  To keep up with the inevitably 
 
 232. See Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 
123, 139 (2006) [hereinafter Wu, Intellectual Property]; Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications 
Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 293–94 (2004). 
 233. See Wu, Intellectual Property, supra note 232, at 134. 
 234. Id. at 139 (“The history of copyright and communications technologies typifies this problem, 
where the holders of copyright block or slow the dissemination of technologies of potentially broad 
social value that threaten an existing market position.  Television broadcasters, for example, blocked 
cable television, and over the last decade the existing radio industry has successfully blocked the arrival 
of new ‘low-power’ FM stations.”). 
 235. Aereo could severely affect broadcasters’ revenue by undercutting the entire retransmission 
fee structure.  Since there is no compulsory fee structure for Internet retransmission services, Aereo will 
never pay a cent to the broadcasters for retransmitting their content.  Consequently, cable providers who 
do pay retransmission fees will gain more leverage in negotiations, and fees will likely decrease.  
 236. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual 
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’  Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve 
rewards commensurate with the services rendered.”). 
 237. The blueprint explored in Part II.B functions for services that capture free or low-cost 
copyrighted content.  In order to build a substantial subscriber base to monetize the business, these 
services have to charge less than the content creators themselves.  Thus, inherent in each service is a 
reliance on using copyrighted content created by, and at the cost of, others.  
 238. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 699 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J., dissenting). 
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advancing landscape, broad application of copyright protection is necessary to 
achieve an appropriate balance between incentivizing content creators and ensuring 
that distributors develop more efficient methods.239 
C.  CONTENT OWNERS CAN USE ALTERNATIVE MEANS TO PROTECT THEIR 
CONTENT 
While the fate of content owners lies partly in the hands of the courts, copyright 
owners can take alternative measures to protect their content.  First, content owners 
could petition Congress to permit the use of Digital Rights  Management  (“DRM”)  
technologies to protect content.240  Television broadcasters employed this tactic 
with some success in 2003, when the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”)   mandated   that   every   consumer   electronic   device   capable   of   receiving  
digital television  signals  be  programmed  to  recognize  a  “broadcast  flag.”241  DRM 
technology could be explored for any copyright owner who wants to place specific 
limits on consumption.242 
Additionally, to minimize their financial harm, broadcasters could lobby for the 
advertising revenue generated on Aereo to be paid back to the television stations.  
With  Nielsen’s  recent  progress  in  tracking  online  streaming,243 it would be feasible 
to track the number of advertising views on Aereo and pay the television stations 
accordingly.  If the extra audience created by Aereo were counted as part of the 
wider television audience, thereby generating value for producers and broadcasters, 
harm to broadcasters would be reduced.  While not an ideal solution for 
broadcasters, monetizing the extra audience garnered by services like Aereo would 
be a possible fallback in the case of undesirable decisions by courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Advances in technology have created an ongoing conflict about the level of 
protection that the public performance right should afford copyright owners.  
Instead of resolving this conflict, the Second Circuit created a loophole for digital 
content providers by focusing on technical architecture instead of practical effect of 
the technology.  In the digital media age, the purpose of traditional copyright 
 
 239. Such broad application is also in line with the traditional rights under copyright law and with 
Congress’ intent, as discussed in Part II.A. 
 240. See Andrew W. Bagley & Justin S. Brown, The Broadcast Flag:  Compatible with Copyright 
Law & Incompatible with Digital Media Consumers, 47 IDEA 607, 608 (2007). 
 241. Id. at 609.  This would restrict the ability to save or record programming, make secondary 
copies or skip commercials.  Although the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s broadcast flag mandate 
for lack of jurisdiction, this could be a viable option to protect broadcasters.   
 242. See Kim, supra note 221, at 295.  Of course, copyright owners could experience consumer 
backlash for limiting the use of their content, which would require a cost-benefit analysis to decide 
whether such protection was worthwhile. 
 243. See Heather Kelly, Nielsen Adds Web Viewers to its TV Ratings, CNN (Oct. 28, 2013), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2013/10/28/tech/web/nielsen-tv-ratings-online; Nielsen Expands Digital Measurement 
with Pilot Program for New Content Ratings, NIELSEN (April 30, 2013), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/ 
press-room/2013/nielsen-expands-digital-measurement-with-pilot-program-for-new-c.html. 
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doctrine and the functional outcome of digital services must be considered.  
Although the Second Circuit has created a blueprint for virtual copyright immunity 
in the digital space, courts can take this opportunity to properly apply the public 
performance right to digital retransmissions, and can restore the proper balance 
between copyright protection and technological innovation. 
